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Strategic Communication: Prices versus
Quantities∗
Ricardo Alonso Wouter Dessein





We examine how cheap talk communication between managers within the
same firm depends on the type of decisions that the firm makes. A firm
consists of a headquarters and two operating divisions. Headquarters is un-
biased but does not know the demand conditions in the divisions’ markets.
Each division manager knows the demand conditions in his market but is
also biased towards his division. The division managers communicate with
headquarters which then sets either the prices or quantities for each divi-
sion. The quality of communication depends on whether headquarters sets
prices or quantities. This is the case even though, once communication has
taken place, expected profits are the same whether headquarters sets prices
or quantities.
∗We thank the Editor George-Marios Angeletos, an anonymous referee, and Jacques Cremer
for their comments and suggestions.
1 Introduction
“If HP knew what HP knows, we would be three times as profitable.”1 This ob-
servation by Lew Platt, the former CEO of Hewlett-Packard, suggests that even
in the age of emails and video conferencing − and even in a high-tech company
such as Hewlett-Packard − there are still significant barriers that limit the flow
of information between managers. And it suggests that these barriers have a
significant eﬀect on the eﬃciency with which firms operate. What are these bar-
riers and to what extent do they limit the performances of firms? One answer to
these questions lies in the old saying that “knowledge is power.” If managers are
biased, they have an incentive to distort the information they share to influence
decision making in their favor. And if they distort the information they share,
and their counterparts understand that they are doing so, valuable information
is lost (Crawford and Sobel 1982). The firms’ managers and their biased incen-
tives are then the barriers that limit the flow of information within firms. The
managers’ incentives to distort information depend on various features of the
environment that the managers and their firms operate in. They depend, for in-
stance, on the distribution of decision rights across managers (Alonso et al. 2008
and Rantakari 2008) and on the degree of product-market competition (Alonso
et al. 2009). Managers’ incentives to distort information also depend on the
type of decisions that firms make. This link between the type of decisions that
firms make and managers’ incentives to distort information is the focus of this
paper. Our central result shows that the flow of information between managers,
and thus the performance of their firm, depends crucially on whether the firm
sets prices or quantities. This is true even when the firm’s performance does
not depend on whether it sets prices or quantities once communication has taken
place.
Our model is a simplified and reduced-form version of the model in Alonso
et al. (2009). A firm consists of a headquarters and two operating divisions.
Each operating division manufactures and sells a good in its own market. An
increase in production by one division increases the total and marginal costs of
the other, for instance, because it uses up scarce resources. Headquarters cares
about overall firm profits but does not observe the demand conditions. Each
division manager, in contrast, observes the demand conditions in his market
but is also biased towards his division. After the division managers observe
the demand conditions in their markets they communicate with headquarters.
Headquarters then makes the decisions that maximize expected profits. The
decisions that headquarters makes are either the prices that the divisions charge
or the quantities that they produce. Note that since headquarters does not
1“Getting Tacit Knowledge to Work,” Financial Times, March 28, 2004.
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commit to decision or transfer rules, communication takes the form of cheap
talk.
In our setting, the firm would be indiﬀerent between setting prices or quan-
tities if headquarters could perfectly observe the demand conditions in both
markets.2 Diﬀerences in expected profits are therefore only due to diﬀerences
in the quality of communication. The quality of communication depends on the
extent to which division managers have an incentive to misrepresent their infor-
mation to influence headquarters’ decision making in their favor. To understand
what determines the quality of communication, we therefore need to understand
division managers’ incentives to misrepresent their information. To do so, note
first that the division managers’ incentives to misrepresent their information do
not depend on there being two interacting and strategic managers. Indeed, the
incentives of any one division manager to misrepresent his information would be
the same if headquarters could perfectly observe the demand shock in the other
market. What is crucial, however, is that by misrepresenting his information,
each division manager is trying to influence two decisions, headquarters’ decision
in his own market and its decision in the other market.
To see this, suppose first that headquarters’ sets quantities and consider the
incentives of Manager 1, the manager in charge of Division 1, to misrepresent
his information. If Manager 1 truthfully reported the demand conditions in his
market, then, from his biased perspective, headquarters would produce too little
in Market 1 and too much in Market 2. To induce headquarters to produce
more in Market 1 and less in Market 2, Manager 1 would like headquarters to
believe that demand conditions in his market are stronger than they actually are.
Manager 1 therefore always has an incentive to overstate the demand conditions
in his market.
Suppose next that headquarters sets prices and consider again the incentives
of Manager 1 to misrepresent the demand conditions in his market. If Manager
1 truthfully reported his information, then, from his biased perspective, head-
quarters would set prices that are too high in Market 1 and too low in Market 2.
Holding constant the price in Market 2, Manager 1 would like headquarters to
believe that demand conditions in his market are weaker than they actually are.
Headquarters would then set a lower price in Market 1. Holding constant the
price in Market 1, however, Manager 1 would like headquarters to believe that
2There are a number of papers that examine a firm’s choice between setting prices and
quantities in the absence of informational problems. Meyer and Klemperer (1986) and Reisinger
and Ressner (2009), for instance, identify factors which favor price- or quantity setting if a firm
needs to adapt to demand shocks. In the absence of uncertainty, Singh and Vives (1984) show
that there is a strategic advantage for oligopolistic firms of committing to fix a quantity rather
than a price. To focus attention on the role of information, we deliberately abstract from any
factors that favor price- or quantity setting in the absence of informational problems.
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demand conditions in his market are stronger than they actually are. Head-
quarters would then expect Division 2’s marginal costs to be high and thus set
a higher price in Market 2. Manager 1 therefore faces countervailing incentives:
on the one hand, he wants to understate demand to reduce the price in his own
market but, on the other, he wants to overstate demand to increase the price in
the other market. Because of these countervailing incentives, Manager 1 wants
to understate demand if conditions are below average and overstate demand if
conditions are above average. If conditions are exactly average, however, Man-
ager 1 has no incentive to misrepresent demand.
These diﬀerences in the division managers’ incentives to misrepresent their
information translate into diﬀerences in how the division managers communicate
and how much information headquarters receives in equilibrium. The crucial
diﬀerence is that the division managers always want to misrepresent their in-
formation when headquarters sets quantities but not if it sets prices. As a
result, headquarters receives more information if it sets prices rather than quan-
tities. And because expected profits depend on the quality of communication,
headquarters also expects to realize higher profits if it sets prices rather than
quantities.
2 The Model
A firm consists of a headquarters and two operating divisions. Divisions 1 and
2 produce 1 and 2 units of their respective goods. Demand for the good
produced by Division  = 1 2 is characterized by the inverse demand function
 =  −   where   0 and   0.
The production costs of Division  = 1 2 are given by  = +12 where
 ≥ 0 and  = 2.3 An increase in production by Division 1 therefore increases
the total and marginal costs of Division 2 and vice versa. This may be the case,
for instance, because both divisions use a common input with a price that is
increasing in the firm’s total demand for the input.
Each division is run by a single manager. The utility function of Manager 1
− the manager in charge of Division 1 − is given by 1 = 1+(1− )2, where
1 and 2 are the profits of Divisions 1 and 2 and  ∈ (12 1] is a parameter
that captures the extent to which Manager 1 is biased towards his own division.
Similarly, the utility function of Manager 2 is given by 2 = 2 + (1− )1.
We follow the modelling approach in Alonso et al. (2008, 2009) and Rantakari
3Our main result also holds for other values of . Setting  = 2 facilitates the character-
ization of the communication equilibrium under price setting since it ensures that the point of
congruence is at  =  for  = 1 2.
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(2008) and assume that the own-division bias is exogenously given. The utility
function of the manager in charge of headquarters is given by  = 1 + 2.
The firm must either decide on the prices or the quantities of the two divi-
sions. We assume that the goods that the divisions produce, and thus the prices
and quantities, cannot be contracted on ex ante or ex post. We focus on the
case in which headquarters has the right to make all the decisions.
The demand conditions in Market  = 1 2 are summarized by the intercept
of the inverse demand function  . It is common knowledge that 1 and 2 are
independently drawn from a uniform distribution with support [−  + ],
where    and  ≤ (− ) 3.4 Manager 1 learns the realization of 1
and Manager 2 learns the realization of 2. After the division managers learn
the demand conditions in their respective markets, they simultaneously send
a message to headquarters. Headquarters then updates its beliefs about the
demand conditions and sets the prices or quantities that maximize the firm’s
expected profits. Since headquarters does not commit to a decision or transfer
rule, communication takes the form of cheap talk.
The timing is as follows. First, each division manager learns the demand
condition in his market. Second, the division managers simultaneously send a
message to headquarters. Third, headquarters sets prices or quantities. Finally,
payoﬀs are realized and the game ends.
3 Decision Making
We start by examining the decisions that headquarters makes for any given
communication rule.
3.1 Quantities
Suppose headquarters receives messages 1 and 2 from the division managers.
It then sets the quantities that maximize the firm’s expected profits conditional
on 1 and 2. The first order conditions for this problem are given by
1 = 1
2 (E [1|1]− )−
1
2
2 and 2 = 1




Solving the first order conditions (1) we find that headquarters’ quantity rules
are
 = 2
3 (E [ | ]− )−
1
3 (E [|]− ) for   = 1 2 and  6= . (2)
4The second inequality ensures that the firm’s production levels are always positive.
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Given these quantity rules, the firm’s expected profits are given by





where 2 = 23 is the variance of the demand conditions in each market and
 = E
h
( − E [ | ])2
i
for  = 1 2 is the residual variance that measures the
quality of communication. If  = 0, the quality of communication is perfect and
if  = 2, no information is communicated. Below we derive the equilibrium
value of the residual variance and show that it depends on whether headquarters
sets prices or quantities.
3.2 Prices
Suppose next that headquarters sets prices rather than quantities. After receiv-
ing messages 1 and 2 headquarters then sets the prices that maximize the
firm’s expected profits conditional on 1 and 2. The first order conditions for
this problem are given by
 = 1
2
(E [ | ] + ) + 1
2
(E [|]− ) for   = 1 2 and  6= . (4)
Solving the first order conditions we find that the prices that headquarters’
charges are given by
1 = 2 = 1
3
(E [1|1] + E [2|2] + )  (5)
Given these pricing rules, the firm’s expected profits are again given by (3). For
any given quality of communication expected profits therefore do not depend on
whether the firm sets prices or quantities. This is the case because, for given
prices, profits are linear in each division’s quantity and, for given quantities, they
are linear in each division’s price. It can also be shown that expected profits are
the same conditional on any posterior belief that headquarters might have about
the demand conditions. After it has received the division managers’ message,
headquarters is therefore indiﬀerent between setting prices and quantities.
4 Incentives to Misrepresent Information
To understand communication between the division managers and headquarters,




Suppose that Manager 1 can credibly misrepresent the demand conditions in his
market. In other words, suppose that he can simply choose the posterior belief
1 ≡ E [1|1] that headquarters has about the market conditions in Market 1.
Manager 1 would then choose the posterior belief ∗1 that solves
max1 E [1 + (1− )2|1]  (6)
subject to the quantities being set according to (2). In equilibrium it has to
be the case that E2 [E [2|2]] = E [2] =  Assuming that this relationship
holds, the posterior ∗1 that solves the maximization problem satisfies ∗1 − 1 =, where
 ≡ 2− 1
4 (− )  0 (7)
is the “communication bias” under quantity setting. Manager 1 therefore always
wants to overstate the demand conditions in his market to induce headquarters to
increase production by his division and reduce production by the other division.
Note that the amount by which he wants to overstate demand does not depend
on the true demand conditions. We will see below that because of this feature
the communication equilibria under quantity setting are analogous to those of
the constant bias example in Crawford and Sobel (1982).
4.2 Prices
Suppose next that headquarters sets prices and assume again that Manager 1
can choose headquarters’ posterior belief 1 ≡ E [1|1] about the demand
conditions in Market 1. Manager 1 would then choose the posterior belief ∗1
that solves (6) subject to prices being set according to the pricing rules (5).
Assuming again that E2 [E [2|2]] = , the posterior belief ∗1 that Manager
1 would choose then satisfies ∗1 − 1 =  (1 − ), where
 ≡ 1
2
(2− 1)  (8)
is the communication bias under price setting. If 1  , Manager 1 has an
incentive to understate the demand conditions to lower 1. And if 1  , he
has an incentive to overstate the demand conditions to increase 2. If 1 = ,
however, Manager 1 has no incentive to misrepresent the demand conditions in
his market.5 In contrast to the quantity setting case, therefore, the extent to
5Note that that this is the case even though for any 1, including 1 = , headquarters
makes diﬀerent decisions than Manager 1 would like it to make.
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which Manager 1 wants to misrepresent his information depends on the true
demand conditions.
5 Strategic Communication
We can now describe the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game. To do so,
we denote by ( | ) the communication rule of Manager  = 1 2 and we
denote by ( | ) headquarters’ belief functions that state the probability of
 given  . Headquarters’ decision rules are given by (2) if it sets quantities
and they are given by (5) if it sets prices.
All communication equilibria are partition equilibria in which the state space
is divided into intervals and the division managers only reveal which inter-
val the demand conditions belong to. Under quantity setting we denote by
 = (0 1 ... ) the partitioning of the state space [−  + ] of
Division  = 1 2 into  intervals, where 0 = − and  = +. The next
proposition describes the equilibria of the communication game when headquar-
ters’ sets quantities.
PROPOSITION 1. Suppose headquarters sets quantities. Then, there exists a
positive integer () such that for every integer 1 ≤  ≤ (),  = 1 2,
there exists at least one equilibrium (1(·) 2(·)  1(·) 2(·) 1(·) 2(·)), where
i. ( | ) is uniform, supported on [−1 ] if  ∈ (−1 )
ii. ( | ) is uniform supported on [−1 ] if  ∈ (−1 )
iii. +1 −  =  − −1 + 4 for  = 1   − 1, and
iv. 1(·) and 2(·) are given by (2).
Moreover, all other equilibria have relationships between 1 and 2 and head-
quarters’ choices of 1 and 2 that are the same as those in this class for some
value of 1 and 2; they are therefore economically equivalent.
As anticipated above, therefore, the communication equilibria in the case of
quantity setting are analogous to those of the constant bias example in Crawford
and Sobel (1982). Essentially, the state space is partitioned into a finite number
of intervals which grow in size as the demand conditions improve. The amount
by which they grow is given by 4, where  is the communication bias under
quantity setting and is given by (7). Intuitively, because the division managers
have an incentive to overstate demand, less information is communicated when
the division managers report strong demand than when they communicate weak
demand.
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We focus on the most informative equilibrium in which the number of par-
titions is maximized. The residual variance for this equilibrium is well known
from Crawford and Sobel (1982) and is reproduced in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose headquarters sets quantities. In the most informa-
tive equilibrium the residual variance is given by  = 2()2+2 ¡()2 − 1¢ 3,
where () is the largest integer that does not exceed ¡1 +p1 + 4¢ 2.
Under price setting all communication equilibria are still partition equilib-
ria but they take a somewhat diﬀerent form than under quantity setting. To
describe the equilibria, we denote by 2 ≡ (−   −1 0 1   )
and 2−1 ≡ (−   −1 1  ) the partitioning of the state space
[ −   + ] of Manager  = 1 2 into 2 and 2 − 1 intervals respectively,
where − = −  0 =  and  = + . Thus, 2 corresponds to finite
interval equilibria with an even number of intervals and 2−1 corresponds to
those with an odd number of intervals. As will be shown in the next proposition,
the intervals are symmetrically distributed around , that is, − = −−
for all  ∈ {1  }. The following proposition characterizes the finite commu-
nication equilibria.
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose headquarters sets prices. Then for every positive
integer    = 1 2, there exists at least one equilibrium (1(·) 2(·)  1(·)2(·) 1(·) 2(·)), where
i. ( | ) is uniform, supported on [−1 ] if  ∈ (−1 )
ii. ( | ) is uniform supported on [−1 ] if  ∈ (−1 )
iii. +1 −  =  − −1 + 4 ( − ) for  = 1   − 1,
−(+1) − − = − − −(−1) + 4 (− −) for  = 1  − 1, and
iv. 1(·) and 2(·) are given by (5).
Moreover, all other finite equilibria have relationships between 1 and 2 and
the managers’ choices of 1 and 2 that are the same as those in this class for
some value of 1 and 2; they are therefore economically equivalent.
The communication equilibria are similar to those examined in Alonso et al.
(2008). Essentially, the state space is partitioned into intervals which are small
when the demand conditions are close to the average  and grow as demand
conditions become more extreme, that is, as | − | increases. The amount
by which they grow is proportional to 4 , where  is the communication bias
under price setting (8). Intuitively, a lot of information is communicated when
demand conditions are close to average because the division managers’ incentives
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are then closely aligned with headquarters. As demand conditions become more
extreme, however, less information is communicated because division managers’
incentives to over- or understate demand become stronger.
We again focus on the most informative equilibrium in which the number of
partitions is maximized. In contrast to the quantity setting case, under price
setting the number of partitions can go to infinity. In this case, there is an accu-
mulation point at  =  in the neighborhood of which partitions are infinites-
imally small. Alonso et al. (2008) characterize these communication equilibria
and determine the residual variance of the most informative equilibrium. The
next proposition applies their results to our setting.
PROPOSITION 4. Suppose headquarters sets prices. In the most informative
equilibrium in which  → ∞, for  = 1 2, the residual variance is given by
 = [(2− 1)  (8+ 2)]2.
We can now compare the quality of communication under quantity and price
setting.
PROPOSITION 5. In the permissible parameter range, that is, when    and
 ≤ (− ) 3, the quality of communication is better under price setting than
under quantity setting, that is,  ≤ 
We saw above that the diﬀerence in expected profits only depends on the
quality of communication. This proposition therefore implies that expected
profits are larger under price than under quantity setting.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we explored this link between the type of decisions that a firm
makes and the extent to which its managers share information with each other.
For this purpose we developed a simple model of a multi-divisional firm in which
division managers communicate with headquarters about the demand conditions
in their markets. The main result in the paper is that the nature and quality of
communication between the division managers and headquarters depends cru-
cially on whether headquarters decides on the price that each division can charge
or on the quantities they need to produce. This is the case even though, once
communication has take place, expected profits do not depend on whether head-
quarters sets prices or quantities.
Our main result is robust to various changes in our model. It continues to
hold, for instance, for diﬀerent values of the externality parameter  and when
the firm faces both demand and cost externalities. Additional results − such
as the relative quality of communication under price and quantity setting − are
9
likely to be sensitive to changes in the specific model we looked at. We leave a
general analysis of the interaction between managerial communication and the
decisions that firms make for future research.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof that all equilibria are interval equilibria
(parts i, ii and iv.) follows the same rationale as in Alonso, et al. 2008. Let be
headquarter’s posterior belief of the expected value of  after receiving message
 For any communication rule of the other Manager, in state  Manager 
must be indiﬀerent between sending a message that induces a posterior  and
a posterior +1 so that E− [ | ]−E− [ | +1] = 0 which
given headquarter’s equilibrium posterior belief  = (−1 + ) 2 implies
that +1 −  =  − −1 + 4  This condition is formally equivalent to
the constant bias example in Crawford and Sobel (1982). ¥
Proof of Proposition 2: See Crawford and Sobel (1982), pp. 1440-1442. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3: The proof that all equilibria are interval equilibria
(parts i, ii and iv) follows the same rationale as in Alonso et al. (2008). Let
 for  = 1 2 be headquarter’s posterior belief of the expected value of 
after receiving message  For any communication rule of the other manager,
in state  manager  must be indiﬀerent between sending a message that
induces a posterior  and a posterior +1 so that E− [ | ] −
E− [ | +1] = 0 which given headquarter’s equilibrium posterior belief = (−1 + ) 2 implies that +1 −  =  − −1 + 4 ( − )
for  = 1   − 1 and −(+1)− − = −− −(−1)+4 (− −) for
 = 1  − 1 This condition is formally equivalent to the communication
equilibria analyzed in Proposition 1 in Alonso et al. (2008). ¥
Proof of Proposition 4: Following a similar derivation as in Lemma 1 in
Alonso et al. (2008), we have that the residual variance for the most infor-
mative equilibrium is given by  = [| |  (3 + 4 | |)]2 Substituting | | =
(2− 1) 2 we obtain  = [(2− 1)  (8+ 2)]2. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5: First we establish a lower bound on . The function
 () = 232 + 2 ¡2 − 1¢ 3 for    ≥ 0 achieves its minimum at  =p with  ³p´ = 23 − 23 which is increasing in  whenever  ≤ 
From the non-negativity restrictions we have that −  ≥ 3 which implies that






≥ 2 [3 (2− 1) 4] 
3










Since 3 (2+ 3)  ¡162¢  1 (2 (4+ 1)) for  ∈ (12 1] we have that  ≥  
¥
References
[1] Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein, and Niko Matouschek (2008): “When Does
Coordination Require Centralization?,”American Economic Review, 98 (1),
145—179.
[2] Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein, and Niko Matouschek (2009): “Organize
to Compete,” mimeo.
[3] Crawford, Vincent and Joel Sobel (1982): “Strategic Information Transmis-
sion,” Econometrica, 50 (6), 1431—145.
[4] Meyer, Meg and Paul Klemperer (1986): “Price Competition vs. Quantity
Competition: The Role of Uncertainty,” The Rand Journal of Economics,
17 (4), 618—638.
[5] Rantakari, Heikki (2008): “Governing Adaptation,” Review of Economic
Studies, 75(4), 1257—1285.
[6] Reisinger, Markus and Ludwig Ressner (2009): “The Choice of Prices
vs. Quantities under Uncertainty,” Journal of Economics and Management
Strategy, 18 (4), 1155—1177.
[7] Singh, Nirvikar and Xavier Vives (1984): “Price and Quantity Competition
in a Diﬀerentiated Duopoly,” The Rand Journal of Economics, 15 (4), 546—
554.
11
